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–  e X e c u t I v e  S u m m a R Y  –
More than a decade after the Dayton Peace Accords, the question remains whether peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) will 
sustain. Assuming that the economic prosperity plays a crucial role for a successful peacebuilding process, this Working Paper 
addresses the potential and the risks of economic development, focusing on three particular aspects: corruption, informal labor 
and the brain drain phenomenon. 
Rob Scheid shows that corruption is an endemic problem concerning governance, civil society, and the economy in BiH. He 
outlines examples of the various forms corruption takes and discusses steps taken to combat this issue, arguing that corruption’s 
detraction from economic development prolongs the peacebuilding process. Julika Bake deals with the phenomenon of illicit labor, 
which is seen as one of the major obstacles to economic prosperity in BiH. She argues that besides macroeconomic recovery and 
labor policy, the links between local political elites and informal employers have to be taken into account to successfully create for-
mal employment. Simon Runkel addresses the difficult labor situation of young people and the resulting emigration, particularly 
of the well educated. In his opinion, reforms in the fields of education as well as private investment are necessary to facilitate the 
return of emigrants and to benefit from the positive long-term effect of the so-called brain drain phenomenon. 
All three sections of this Working Paper hold that the peacebuilding process would benefit to a great extent from the strengthening 
of formal economic relations, the weakening of links between the economic and political spheres, especially on a local level, as well 
as from the creation of job opportunities. Although economic prosperity and sustainable development often seem beneficial they 
do not appear to be a primary concern in peacebuilding. This paper shows that economic aspects are crucial to the question of 
whether peace will stay and last in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Introduction
“Nothing, I repeat nothing, worries me more than this 
country’s economy.”
Paddy Ashdown, then High Representative, be-
fore the Bosnian parliament in December 2002
Thirteen years after the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) it 
is still uncertain whether peace in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na (BiH) will be sustainable. The presence and the powers 
of the international community in BiH have enforced a 
political system that, though weak, manages to channel 
previously violent ethnic conflicts through institutional 
mechanisms. With political institutions established and 
more or less functioning, political power and responsibi-
lity are currently being transferred from the international 
administration, mainly the Office of the High Representa-
tive (OHR) 1, to state and entity2 institutions. 
Meanwhile, Bosnia’s economic situation remains fragile. 
At the end of the war in 1995, BiH had to catch up on the 
transformation to a market economy that its fellow former 
0 The three authors participated in the graduate course 
“Analyzing Post-Conflict Environments – The Case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina” in the summer term of 2006 and a follow-up 
research workshop, both taught by Christian Braun and Kai 
Hebel. This Working Paper draws on the course and particularly 
the seven-day excursion in July 2006 during which Simon Runkel 
and Rob Scheid met representatives from different international 
and national organizations in Sarajevo for information sessions 
and interviews.
1 It must be noted that the OHR, while responsible under           
Dayton for a majority of the post-war oversight and coordination 
functions in BiH, was not initially responsible for economic 
development. Now, however, this has become one of the OHR’s 
tasks.
2 As a federal state, BiH is divided into two entities - the             
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) and the Republika 
Srpska (RS), as well as the district of Brčko. Each of the entities 
has its own constitution, parliament, government and police 
system, among others. 
Socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had be-
gun years before, struggling with issues such as privatiza-
tion and job creation. In addition to that, however, it faces 
the challenges of a post-war economy, including informal 
markets as well as the demobilization and economic re-
integration of soldiers. These are formidable obstacles for 
a state as severely disrupted by war as Bosnia and Her-
zegovina: approximately 100,000 people died (Research 
and Documentation Center Sarajevo 2008), more than a 
million (one-fourth of its inhabitants) were internally dis-
placed (Calic 1995: 238), and the war damage to the in-
frastructure was estimated to be at least 20-30 billion US 
Dollars (US General Accounting Office 1997: 19).
While international aid has started to decrease significant-
ly in recent years, the economy is still not back on track. 
In 2002, the real gross domestic product (GDP) lagged at 
approximately three quarters of the 1989 level with an an-
nual growth rate of 3.8 percent that failed to reach even the 
“worst case” objective of 5 percent outlined by the World 
Bank in 1997 (European Stability Initiative [ESI] 2006: 78-
79; World Bank 2005a: 4).3 
Here the question of a link between economic growth and 
a sustainable peace remains. As early as 1992 UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda For Peace men-
tioned the handling of underlying economic problems as 
one of the preconditions for durable peace (par. 57). The 
exact causes and effects, that is the manifestation of the in-
terdependence of economic development and sustainable 
peace, is still unclear, as “there has been no systematic ana-
lysis of the contribution of economic factors to the success 
3 The enormous amount of international aid pumped into         
Bosnia did not kick-start the economy as hoped. It only led to a 
deceiving annual GDP increase averaging 40 percent from 1996-
1999 and generated little new employment outside the public 
sector (ESI 2006: 83).
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or failure in the implementation of peace agreements.” 
(Woodward 2002: 183).4 Similarly, there does not seem to 
be an agreement on the “appropriate economic strategy 
specifically addressed to the tasks of implementing peace 
agreements and the first years after war” (Woodward 2002: 
185). However, there seems to be a consensus among scho-
lars and practitioners in the field that economic success is 
essential to building peace.5 Woodward argues that “while 
armed hostilities may cease, growing economic inequali-
ties and hardship can fuel increased violence from crime 
or social crises after the peace agreement, thus substan-
tially complicating the tasks of building peace and stable 
government” (Woodward 2002: 184).6 
Based on an analysis of the varying links between econo-
my and conflict, both the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Tech-
nische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and International Alert 
acknowledge economic factors of peacebuilding (Mierke 
2006: 5; Gündüz/Vailant 2006: 8). The GTZ concludes that 
development projects should aim to (1) address causes of 
conflict or factors that increase the risk or duration for 
violent conflict, e.g. by supporting economic growth and 
poverty alleviation, reducing [horizontal] inequality such 
as between regions or ethnic groups, decreasing the de-
pendence on primary commodities and broadening the 
economic base by diversification and industrial develop-
ment, reducing the financial resources for conflict, as well 
as (2) to enhance factors contributing to conflict preven-
tion, peacebuilding and reconciliation, e.g. by suppor-
ting the ability to participate in and benefit from trade, 
and promoting reconciliation and trust building (Mierke 
2006: 5). 
“(Therefore) a thriving economy is essential to building 
peace. The jobs it generates, the livelihoods it sustains, the 
4 Pointing out the limited success of generous economic         
cooperation programmes e.g. in Afghanistan, the Non-
governmental Organization (NGO) International Alert points 
out that there is a clear need to better understand how a 
peacebuilding approach to such economic interventions can be 
achieved in practice, and how they can be made conflict-sensitive. 
International Alert has been conducting a research project on 
the positive potential of economic interventions, gathering a 
collection of country case studies on the international 
community’s activities in this field, as well as carrying out expert 
consultations and policy-research (International Alert Website).
5 At the same time, scholars and practitioners are aware that           
economic factors often also contribute to conflict to a crucial 
extent.
6 According to her, three economic tasks are necessary to          
implement a peace agreement: (1) sufficiently rapid economic 
revival to buy confidence in the peace process, (2) funding to 
implement specific commitments in the peace agreement and (3) 
the economic foundations necessary to sustain peace over the 
long term (Woodward 2002: 185).
opportunities it delivers and the relationships it can help to 
build are all critical to giving societies a stake in a non-vio-
lent future. Trade within and between countries is not just a 
driver of economic growth but can also serve to establish or 
re-establish personal and business connections across con-
flict divides.” (Gündüz/Vaillant 2006: 36)
In this Working Paper, we will not examine the landmark 
issues of the economic sphere, let it be poverty reduc-
tion, private sector development or trade development. 
Instead, we focus on three rather specific, yet interrela-
ted aspects of the current state of the Bosnian economy. 
First, Rob Scheid examines the role of corruption in the 
BiH economy, including the serious problem it poses for 
establishing legitimate institutions. He outlines examples 
of the various forms corruption takes and discusses steps 
taken to combat this issue, arguing that corruption’s de-
traction from economic development prolongs the pea-
cebuilding process. Next, Julika Bake examines informal 
labor from an economic and a cultural angle and indicates 
policy options for tackling it. She argues that a control or 
reduction of informal labor can only be achieved through 
a set of culture-sensitive measures in addition to traditi-
onal macroeconomic policy. In the third and final part, 
Simon Runkel analyzes the challenges and perspectives 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economy and education sys-
tem regarding the issue of brain drain. He concludes on 
a counter-intuitive note, emphasizing the potential posi-
tive long-term effects of the phenomenon – remittances, 
transnational networks and the likelihood of returnees 
starting a business in BiH. 
While economic prosperity does not provide an easy so-
lution to many of the country’s problems – and likewise 
does not automatically correlate with the success of the 
peace building process - we argue that a better handling of 
the specific issues we address could contribute to greater 
economic prosperity and thereby make an overall positive 
contribution to sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. 
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a) the extent and Implications 
of corruption in Bosnia and her-
zegovina  by Rob Scheid
Corruption is one of the primary impediments to deve-
lopment in both rich and poor nations across the globe. 
According to Transparency International (TI), corruption 
undermines economic growth and sustainable develop-
ment at the state level. It does this by discouraging foreign 
investment, undermining domestic institutions, and wea-
kening the rule of law (TI 2007).
Throughout this section of the working paper, it will be de-
monstrated that corruption is one of the most important 
problems facing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s peace building 
efforts. Specific to BiH, corruption also inhibits successful 
implementation of the DPA (Marquis/Gall 2000), thereby 
potentially undermining democratic control by prolon-
ging the international community’s role in national decisi-
on-making processes and slowing its handover of control 
to domestic institutions. The United States Government 
Accountability Office (2003) found “near consensus opi-
nion among officials (...) interviewed that endemic crime 
and corruption in Bosnia” is a serious problem and “that 
until the situation is satisfactorily addressed the condi-
tions for the complete withdrawal of the NATO-led force 
will not be met.” Although the NATO Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) transferred control to EUFOR on December 2, 
2005, the continuing presence of international troops un-
derscores the ongoing necessity of oversight and a lack of 
domestic control, for which corruption acts as a perpetual 
hindrance.
The following section will look at the general problem 
of corruption and will be followed by an extrapolation 
of these general arguments in terms of the situation in 
BiH, specifically on three levels, namely Corruption and 
Governance (1.1), Economic Issues (1.2), and Civil Society 
Concerns (1.3). The types of issues have been divided into 
sub-categories in order to provide a better overview of the 
various effects of corruption on the nation’s development. 
The next section will look at efforts undertaken to com-
bat corruption in BiH, including specific strategies and 
accords, and will conclude with an assessment of these 
measures. Thereafter, a brief conclusion will consider the 
overall problem and future outlook of corruption in BiH.
1. The Importance of Combating Corruption 
for Future Economic and Political 
Development
The ten-year anniversary of the Dayton Accords in 2005 
sparked several analyses of the current state of BiH. 
Though conclusions on the country’s status differ across 
various fields, several political assessments fail to mention 
corruption as one of the most important aspects, although 
they address several other areas of reform (Kim 2006). In 
fact, neither the OHR nor other critical international ac-
tors in Bosnia have drafted a full report on the extent of 
the country’s corruption problem (Chandler 2003: 4). This 
fact makes the availability and reliability of data poor. Re-
search must rely primarily on media reporting on the is-
sue, which is selective and – as we will see – the media can 
also fall victim to corruption in BiH. Additionally, various 
reports are available from NGOs present in the country, 
which should also be analyzed carefully due to the wide-
ranging scope of interests that NGOs represent and the 
potential connection with donor interests. Although no 
comprehensive reports are available, both former High 
Representatives (HR) Ashdown and Westendorp have 
cited corruption as the most pressing issue facing deve-
lopment (Karatnycky/Motyl 2000: 160), while former HR 
Westendorp’s Office developed a comprehensive strategy 
to combat corruption (OHR 1999). This may seem coun-
terintuitive, yet it only means that analyses of the specific 
corruption problems have not been widely published, alt-
hough a plan was developed to fight the overarching pro-
blem (that was later abandoned). The fact that BiH ranks 
at number 93 out of 179 on TI’s (2006) Corruption Percep-
tion Index (CPI), along with Argentina, Armenia, Eritrea, 
Syria, and Tanzania, further supports the critical nature of 
this issue. It must be noted that this index is measured by 
a variety of factors, including opinion surveys and expert 
assessments. Additionally, “over 50% of Bosnian citizens 
believed corruption was prevalent in government and 
business. However this is consistent with similar polls in 
Central and Eastern Europe” (Chandler 2003: 4). To brief-
ly compare BiH to other Balkan countries, these nations 
can be found at positions 28 (Slovenia), 69 (Croatia), 90 
(Serbia) and 105 (Macedonia). This range is quite large, but 
all countries, with the exception of Slovenia, fall between 
indicators that show high levels of perceived corruption.
As one of the greatest overarching issues impeding po-
litical and economic development in BiH, corruption 
is a problem both inherited and nurtured by the course 
of events in Bosnian history. The transformation from 
a planned to a market economy has brought to light the 
lack of transparency in government and business practices 
alike. According to a Nations in Transit (1999-2000: 139) 
report, “privatization has made little or no progress in the 
post-Dayton period, largely because the socialist system 
of economic management in place from the old system 
works to the advantage of the ruling parties.” In additi-
on to problems with transformation, the formal economy 
collapsed during the war, leaving a thriving black market 
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and production levels that have yet to match pre-war le-
vels (Chandler 2003: 3). The war caused the economy to 
“largely disintegrate along ethnic lines, with Bosnian and 
Croat areas oriented towards trade with Croatia, and the 
RS oriented towards trade with Yugoslavia” (Karatnycky/
Motyl 2000:139). The report states that, as a result of many 
of these factors, “many officials were claiming that corrup-
tion in BiH’s political system had become the primary im-
pediment to economic reform” (Karatnycky/Motyl 2000: 
139).
Before further analyzing the problem of corruption, it 
is necessary to define the term. According to Vito Tanzi 
(2002: 11), former Director of the Fiscal Affairs Depart-
ment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “the 
most popular and simplest definition of corruption is that 
it is the abuse of public power for private benefit.” The typi-
cal definition used in academic works is that of the World 
Bank, exchanging “power” in Tanzi’s definition for “office.” 
In this work the IMF definition will be used, as not all ex-
amples of corruption cited can be traced directly to public 
office, but rather the overarching concept of systemic cor-
ruption that is influenced by public power abuse.
An important factor to note, when looking at the issue 
of corruption, is the problematic divide between “public” 
and “private” spheres that did not exist in socialist 
countries. One of the most important factors for analyzing 
transformation in post-socialist nations is the gray area 
created due to the symbiosis of these two spheres under 
socialist rule. In some cases, issues with corruption can 
be explained by this lack of separation. The problem is 
therefore that these areas have not yet been separated 
to function according to different logics. This should be 
kept in mind when looking at the issues presented in this 
paper.
The following sections delineate corruption into three 
subcategories: governance, the economy, and civil society. 
The analysis of corruption from these three perspectives 
attempts to provide a framework for further analyzing 
corruption based on the thematic field it affects. Here it 
should also be noted that the examples cited cover many 
levels and degrees of corruption and span a wide range 
of issues, including: clientelism, embezzlement, human 
trafficking, bribery, tax evasion, and informal labor. Whi-
le some of these problems have a criminal nature, others 
indicate less severe problems. These examples serve to 
highlight the systemic issues present that allow for such a 
range of problems. While some examples denote criminal 
behavior, it is the structural framework that allows for this 
behavior that should be highlighted in this paper.
1.1 Corruption and Governance
This section focuses on the “top-down” effects of corrup-
tion. In this section, systemic problems will be touched 
upon, including the rule of law and transparency of go-
vernment institutions.
Chandler states that “the root cause of corruption was 
Bosnia’s political leadership” (Chandler 2003: 3). Addi-
tionally, former IMF director Vito Tanzi concludes that 
“corruption cannot be substantially reduced without mo-
difying the way governments operate, and in this sense, 
the fight against corruption is linked with the reform of 
the state” (Abed/Gupta 2002: 11). This underlines one of 
the most common and important approaches to analyzi-
ng and ultimately combating corruption. Next, it is ne-
cessary to examine the extent of government corruption 
in BiH and its effects. Here a distinction must be made 
between corruption within the government and corrupti-
on facilitated by a deficiency in the rule of law. This section 
addresses both types.
It must first be considered that the framework under 
which corruption in governance in BiH has taken root co-
mes from a combination of historical developments – the 
previously outlined structure inherited by the former so-
cialist system, the collapse of the formal economy during 
the war, and the decentralized structure of governance 
established by the DPA. The combination of these three 
systems facilitates a lack of accountability. This has crea-
ted a system based on “’rule of party’ rather than ‘rule of 
law,’ and an absence of accountability and transparency let 
alone a culture of consultation and consensus building” 
(Chandler 2003: 3). According to Nations in Transit (1999-
2000: 160), “official corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is widespread, involving government officials at the highest 
levels, their families, and subordinates in the governmen-
tal bureaucracies.” This problem was also summarized by 
Richard Holbrooke, then U.S. ambassador to the UN and 
leading negotiator of the Dayton Agreement, who said 
in November 2000 that Bosnia’s leading politicians were 
“crooks pretending to be nationalists” (Chandler 2003: 4). 
These quotes taken together emphasize the extensiveness 
of the problem of corruption in the public sphere, or rat-
her that the public sphere is not legitimately public, due to 
its private use and abuse by officials.
The most prevalent example of high-level political cor-
ruption is the use of international funds to cover lost tax 
revenues or government funds lost to crime and corrup-
tion. The estimates given are not satisfactory assessments 
of the extent to which these losses occur, as it is usually 
a simple approximation based on the amount of interna-
tional funds provided to cover budget deficits (Chandler 
2003: 4). According to the USGAO (2000: 2-3), “the inter-
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national community has provided about $ 407 million in 
budget support to cover Bosnia’s budget deficits, and most 
of this support is not controlled or audited. Consequent-
ly, the international community cannot be sure how the 
money it has provided is spent.” This raises the question 
regarding the potential misappropriation of international 
funds. While covering budget deficits and not properly 
accounting for appropriated money is a concern, many 
agree that direct fraudulent usage of funds is not a major 
concern due to the preventative mechanisms in place. In 
contrast to its previous statement, the USGAO (1999: 2) 
concurs in the same report that “international assistance 
(...) is generally not being lost to fraud and corruption” 
due to the extent of internal and international controls. 
The New York Times (1999) nevertheless reports that “up 
to $ 1 billion has been stolen from international aid pro-
jects or has disappeared from public funds or been lost 
through Bosnian officials’ failure to collect taxes.” Howe-
ver, this claim disregards the difference between active ab-
use and the passive loss of funds due to failure to collect. 
The USGAO report finds little evidence of the former. The 
press article could have referred to the loss of $ 900,000 
by the U.S. Embassy in a situation in which a local bank 
failed. It is believed, however, that this money is fully reco-
verable (Chandler 2003: 4).
Other governmental problems include the extension of 
corruption to affect the media. An independent media is 
a cornerstone of a functioning democratic society, which 
entails the ability to report on critical and controversi-
al topics without interference. According to one report, 
“nationalist parties (...) found many ways to intimidate 
the press” (Committee to Protect Journalists 2000). The 
report includes several examples, citing “138 press free-
dom abuses between November 1999 and October 2000” 
(Committee to Protect Journalists 2000). These violations 
include direct threats and physical attacks for reporting 
against ethnic groups on issues such as war crimes. Also, 
indirect abuses can be found, such as the slow processing 
of legal cases and the misuse of legal powers such as tax 
inspections to threaten or, in the case of one newspaper, 
delay printing. According to the report, these abuses are 
primarily divided along ethnic lines and encompass all 
groups in one form or another (Committee to Protect 
Journalists 2000).
Forced prostitution is also a major concern not only in the 
realm of human rights, but also in terms of corruption. 
According to Human Rights Watch (2002), traffickers in 
BiH are intimidating women seeking jobs in Western Eu-
rope into prostitution rings, in which they are traded and 
sold, while being forced to work off “debts.” Governmen-
tal corruption comes into play because, according to the 
report, “local officials often fail to investigate and arrest 
traffickers, while blaming the victims for their reluctance 
to testify. Meanwhile, [some] international police officers 
patronize the clubs where trafficked women perform, 
sending a strong message to trafficking victims that they 
cannot trust the authorities to help them escape their ‘ow-
ners’” (Human Rights Watch 2002). This example clearly 
demonstrates that the lacking rule of law allows corrupti-
on to become an all-encompassing phenomenon, trickling 
down from higher to lower levels, in this case from orga-
nized traffickers to the patrons of the respective clubs. The 
USGAO (1999: 2) report supports this claim, maintaining 
that “Bosnia’s law enforcement and judicial systems are 
inadequate and institutionally incapable of prosecuting 
cases of corruption or administering justice.” One major 
reason for this is that accountability and transparency 
were not only lacking in the previous system, but also the 
current decentralized system in which the state govern-
ment, entities, cantons, and municipalities “obscure lines 
of responsibility and make accountability difficult and, at 
times, impossible” (Mertus 2005: 2). In other words, Day-
ton has partially contributed to the corruption problem 
while the OHR simultaneously attempts to combat it. At 
the same time, “Bosnian leaders from all ethnic groups 
may have little incentive to combat corruption, since cur-
bing corruption may reduce their ability to maintain their 
control” (USGAO 1999: 3).
An additional example of low-level corruption by govern-
ment officials can be seen by their ordering that school 
classrooms “be painted four times within one year (with 
the benefits from the work going to a local contractor), 
despite the fact that the schools had been rebuilt and re-
painted by international aid organizations” (Karatnycky/
Motyl 2000: 160-161). Additionally, officials paid the-
se contractors significantly more than the going rate for 
the work. Another example of this is the truckers’ lobby, 
which bribed officials to keep rail lines closed for much 
longer than was intended in the rebuilding of the nation’s 
infrastructure, which was done in order to help their own 
interest of employment (NIT 1999-2000: 160). Many more 
examples of clientelism can be found, but it is already evi-
dent that with such high levels of corruption on the go-
vernance level, even policemen are unlikely to be working 
for the people, but rather for themselves or ethnic political 
parties that look out for their interests (USGAO 1999: 3). 
With these issues, a lack of trust in public institutions is 
perpetuated.
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1.2 Economic Issues
“Legal and ethical standards proscribing public and private 
sector activity for government officials are weakly developed. 
Throughout the Balkan states, control of the government has 
usually entailed control of the economy, and traditionally, 
individuals have entered government at least in part to en-
rich themselves. [...] Top officials have strong, direct and of-
ten illicit ties to business” (Karatnycky/Motyl 2000: 160).
Corruption in the economy is difficult to separate from 
the other dimensions, but this section will focus primari-
ly on the macro-level challenging from the lack of a truly 
independent “private” sphere. One prime example that 
represents the challenges of corruption in the economy 
is that of McDonald’s. The company was initially interes-
ted in opening a restaurant in Sarajevo, but withdrew its 
plans when officials demanded bribes (Karatnycky/Motyl 
2000: 160). In addition, officials are involved in clear cri-
minal actions, such as smuggling various goods, including 
timber, gasoline, cigarettes (estimated to be $ 230 million 
annually) (Chandler 2003: 3), alcohol, and coffee (Karat-
nycky/Motyl 2000: 160).
In order to look at the economy as separate from other di-
mensions, corruption in relation to various national factors 
should first be considered. One of the major challenges for 
economic development is attracting both foreign and do-
mestic investment. In light of the declining international 
aid, foreign investment is seen as one of the key factors to 
improving the Bosnian economy. With the international 
community being responsible for attracting investment, 
its failure is even more noteworthy. Corruption is seen as 
the main factor preventing significant long-term growth 
as well as project investment (Chandler 2003: 3).
A legitimately functioning economy is also essential for 
the sustainable operations of the government. The infor-
mal sector of the economy accounts for over 50 percent of 
all economic activity (CIA World Factbook 2006), which 
will be elaborated upon in the following section of this pa-
per. Along these lines:
“Up to 80% of the people working in private firms had no of-
ficial employment contracts. Neither these workers nor their 
employers pay taxes to the government, nor do they contri-
bute to pension or health insurance funds, which partially 
accounted for the constant deficits in these funds” (Karatny-
cky/Motyl 2000: 162).
One of the underlying reasons for such a thriving shadow 
economy is the cost of privatization. Not only do honest 
private businesses typically lose money or make a very 
small profit if they pay all taxes and follow the current 
rules, but they are also often forced to lay off employees 
as a part of the privatization process. The informal econo-
my is also directly related to unemployment figures. Due 
to the number of workers off the books, official numbers 
place unemployment at approximately 45.5 percent, while 
estimates including the shadow economy declare it is more 
likely that unemployment lies between 25 and 30 percent 
(CIA World Factbook 2006).7 
1.3 Civil Society Concerns
One important factor to consider as a backdrop for civil 
society is the “nationalist party structures that took root 
during the war and Bosnian mindsets formed by years of 
autocratic and communist rule” (Chandler 2003: 6). These 
have influenced local perspectives to a great degree, but 
this section shows that corruption plays an even greater 
role in the current outlook of many Bosnians.
Considering the previously outlined corruption and eth-
nic clientelism facilitated by “top-down” structures, other 
levels of society remain susceptible to similar issues. The 
“bottom-up” examples in this section, though often seen as 
minor in comparison, can be even more destructive when 
considering the long-term effects on societal customs. For 
example, with the permeation of lower levels of society, 
corruption causes frustration, cynicism, and overall loss 
of faith in the government and system. This can result in 
a society in which “citizens view their own public officials 
with great distrust and local businessmen with perhaps 
even greater skepticism” (Mertus 2005: 2). At present, it is 
easy to confirm that a majority of Bosnians perceive their 
government as corrupt, as shown in the previously men-
tioned TI poll. As a result, it is “no wonder Bosnians are 
cynical about democracy” (Mertus 2005: 2), as they feel 
that the officials they elect cannot be trusted.
These viewpoints are critical for the future of the coun-
try, as they signify a loss of hope. When civil society lo-
ses any sense of optimism, this leads to deeper problems, 
such as voter fatigue and brain drain, which will be exa-
mined in the third part of this Working Paper. One exa-
mple that illustrates this can be seen in education. In an 
article appropriately titled “Nothing can be done without 
corruption in Bosnia” a South African newspaper alleges 
the forgery of university diplomas as a result of a policy to 
assist with the recovery of lost documents during the war. 
Many students bribe professors in order to pass exams, or 
even to receive degrees quickly. The article states that cor-
ruption permeates all levels of education, even including 
7    For more information, see the following section by Julika 
Bake.
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primary schools. According to a survey of 800 university 
students, “90% of them believed there was a problem with 
corruption at their faculties” (Mail and Guardian 2006). 
Such examples signify a complete loss of faith in natio-
nal institutions and behavior justified by a need to survive 
economically. 
2. Steps Taken to Combat Corruption
David Chandler of Westminster University notes: “For 
many [...] there is an assumption that anti-corruption 
strategies fit closely with the aims of good governance and 
can be effective in increasing the accountability of state 
institutions and revitalizing networks of trust in civil so-
ciety” (Chandler 2003: 2; Doig/Riley 2006). This quote 
summarizes the goals of an effective anti-corruption strat-
egy. Though not exhaustive, the following section outlines 
various measures taken to combat corruption, concluding 
with a short evaluation of these varying strategies.
Much like many in Bosnia see European integration as a 
solution that transcends ethnicities and political groups, 
anti-corruption efforts should also be considered a unify-
ing domestic goal. Former Prime Minister Adnan Terzic 
of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action, the first prime 
minister to serve a full four-year term since the war, has 
“listed growth and investment and fighting crime and cor-
ruption as his government’s priorities” (BBC News 2006). 
This potentially shows a national interest in significantly 
reducing corruption, although it is more likely to be sim-
ple lip-service, considering the lack of concrete results 
thereafter.
The most noteworthy attempt to tackle the issue was the 
OHR’s Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy for Bos-
nia and Herzegovina from 2005, which seems to have been 
abandoned for no apparent reason. The strategy was based 
on four pillars: education and public awareness, the elimi-
nation of opportunities, transparency and reporting, and 
securing control and penalties (OHR 2005). One criticism 
of this strategy, however, is that it was simply a summary 
of existing international efforts, which have not been well 
coordinated (USGAO 1999: 4). This could be a reason for 
the lack of activity in this area by the OHR. Within the 
other international strategies, the European Commission 
remains committed to combating corruption. Currently, 
it is supporting a Corruption Perception Study and has 
created a Corruption Hotline, allowing for assessment 
and suggestions for fighting corruption by citizens. It also 
represents the first national database for compiling cases 
of corruption (European Commission 2008). The EC Cus-
toms Assistance Office effort to streamline customs was 
considered to be one of the most significant accomplish-
ments in the fight against corruption (Sullivan 2006). This 
can be seen by the 2005 implementation of a single-rate 
value-added tax (VAT) at 17 percent, which is considered a 
great step in streamlining import regulations to eliminate 
opportunities for corrupt practices and to ensure steady 
revenue from imports (OHR 2005).
A second notable effort has been the UN International Po-
lice Task Force and its work training local police, which 
has since been taken over by European Union initiatives 
under EUPOL (USGAO 1999: 5). Before leaving office, 
High Representative Ashdown also mentioned police res-
tructuring as one of the priorities that needs to continue 
(OHR 2005). As an individual effort, this is a small step, 
but such steps are vital to improving each dimension that 
facilitates corruption.
Many efforts have been made by international and local 
institutions to strengthen the rule of law in order to pro-
perly prosecute organized crime and corruption. These 
efforts have produced mixed results. The recently establis-
hed State Court of BiH handles not only war crimes cases, 
but also organized crime.8 According to Kevin Sullivan, 
this court is a positive step because it has the ability to 
prosecute criminals who were long thought to be above 
the law due to mafia-like structures and the lack of a pro-
per prosecution system. While noting the limitations of a 
court that has been in existence for only a few years and 
was only hearing sixteen cases at the time of the interview, 
Sullivan emphasizes the positive long-term psychological 
effects the institution could provide (2006).
Since 2000, BiH has signed several international anti-cor-
ruption conventions.9 The list is long and impressive at 
first glance, but the question remains as to how dedicated 
government officials are in enforcing these conventions, 
as well as whether BiH was simply coerced into these con-
ventions by the OHR on the one hand and the internatio-
nal donor community on the other.
Paddy Ashdown established the Crime Strategy Group in 
order to help BiH fight organized crime and corruption 
with the goal of meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU 
integration, which, according to a report by the office of 
the EU Special Representative, closed down in November 
8 For information on current trials, visit the Court’s homepage          
at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/, last accessed: August 30, 2008.
9 These conventions include the UN Convention against                   
Transnational Crime, New York, (Dec. 15, 2000, ratified on April 
25, 2001), Sanction-Corrective Anti-Corruption Convention 
(ratified on April 25, 2001), Civil Law Convention against 
Corruption (ratified on April 25, 2001), Statement on Intent on 
Accession to the Council of Europe Assembly of States for Fight 
against Corruption – GRECO group (full membership on 
February 25, 2000), UN Convention against Corruption (signed 
on September 1, 2005).
   13
B a k e,  R u N k e l ,  S c h e I d :  S o c I o - e co N o m I c  a S p e c t S  o f  p e ac e B u I l d I N g . cc S  w o r k i n g  pa p e r s  N o.  8
2006 (European Union Special Representative in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 2006).
Unfortunately, these and many other efforts have only had 
limited success, due in part to the lack of commitment 
from Bosnian officials. Although referring to the situation 
almost 10 years ago, the evaluation provided by the US-
GAO remains relevant: “the Bosnian government’s efforts 
have primarily been to create committees and commissi-
ons that have failed to become operational or measurably 
reduce crime and corruption” (1999: 4).
The role of the OHR in combating such an issue is rapid-
ly declining. According to the homepage of the OHR, the 
goal has been set to close this ad hoc office by June 30, 
2008. It can already be seen that many of the units, initia-
tives, and activities of the OHR have been scaled back, eli-
minated, or otherwise been transferred over to EU institu-
tions. While many problem-solving strategies have made 
little progress, it remains to be seen if the country will be 
able to improve the situation now that much of the inter-
national community has turned its attention elsewhere.
3. Outlook
Throughout this section, it has been shown that corrup-
tion is an endemic problem in BiH. The issue has been 
analyzed within three sections (governance, the economy, 
and civil society), with the inclusion of several examples. 
Finally, the current steps being taken to combat corrupti-
on have been briefly outlined.
Corruption defies simple solutions. Some argue for further 
international controls without taking into account that this 
potentially undermines the legitimacy of domestic institu-
tions. Others argue that centralization of the Bosnian go-
vernment is the solution, although this approach has seve-
ral hurdles. First of all, it would involve changing the DPA, 
which was successful in halting the armed conflict, but is 
proving damaging to the sovereignty of BiH, therefore 
reducing the ability for the Bosnian government to take 
control of such issues as corruption. Another restriction 
to centralizing the Bosnian government, it can be argued, 
is that the potential of nationalist abuse of a centralized 
structure puts the nation at risk of further conflict.
The existing efforts to combat corruption have seen mixed 
results for many reasons. Lack of coordination is one pri-
mary reason, which can be cited as an issue when looking 
at all development efforts in BiH. With the sheer amount 
of international organizations, government bodies, and 
outside interests present, Bosnia and Herzegovina has be-
come the victim of the classic bureaucratic problem of co-
ordinating each interest to move collectively towards se-
veral, often conflicting, goals. However, BiH additionally 
faces the problem of certain waves of interest by the inter-
national community. It continues to be difficult to obtain 
funding for projects that are not as pressing as the imme-
diate humanitarian crises facing the nation directly after 
the war. While the European Union remains engaged, this 
could change if the EU faces accession fatigue. Another 
factor regarding this prospect is the shift of the EU with 
the gradual accession of Eastern European nations, most 
recently Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. These changes are 
causing a different dynamic in the EU, including a redefi-
ned institution from the original union. Within this fra-
mework, the problem of corruption is also one typical of 
other nations already members of the EU, while the com-
plexities emerging from post-socialist transitions can be 
witnessed in many of the recently admitted EU nations.
Despite these limitations, the option that many in Bosnia 
remain committed to and hope will solve a great deal of 
the remaining problems is the prospect of European inte-
gration. The hope is that integration will bring about gre-
ater economic prosperity on the one hand and implement 
policy initiatives that the country may otherwise not be 
able to on the other. This perspective, however, is likely too 
optimistic. There are several countries within the Europe-
an Union with corruption problems comparable to that of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, so European integration is unli-
kely to provide the sweeping solution.
Combating corruption, a major aspect of economic deve-
lopment in any country, is particularly important in the 
case of BiH due to the impact economic development has 
on the entire peacebuilding process. Corruption is one 
element that greatly affects public perception of the eco-
nomic state. In a nation with fresh scars still visible, such 
a perception alone can be enough to tip the balance of 
peacebuilding. Without a positive perception, stagnation 
or even further violence is possible. Socio-economic as-
pects gain a heightened importance in post-war societies, 
as they often represent the tangible aspects of a better life. 
Without improvement in these areas, the peacebuilding 
process can be stalled, ultimately decreasing democratic 
(and independent) control of the country and prolonging 
international engagement.
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B) making a living in Bosnia-her-
zegovina – Informal labor and 
policy options  by Julika Bake
1. Economic Development and Informal 
Activities
When discussing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) econo-
mic prospects, one quickly comes across the issue of the 
informal economy. It is always named as one of the major, 
if not the main obstacle to development and stability. The 
CIA World Factbook (2006) estimates that the informal 
sector potentially encompasses half of the country’s real 
GDP of $ 22.89 billion in 2005. 
Generally, the term “informal economy” refers to “all 
economic activities by workers and economic units that 
are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficient-
ly covered by formal arrangements” (Flodman Becker 
2004: 11). Although some speak of the “informal sector,” 
it does not only cover a particular sector, e.g. subsistence 
farming. It is not confined to marginal activities, but also 
includes profitable enterprises. It can neither be regarded 
as completely separated from formal economic processes 
and structures, nor is it necessarily criminal – to a large 
extent, it consists of goods such as pharmaceuticals and 
labor services whose production and distribution is per-
fectly legal.
For the state, informal economic activities can have seri-
ous consequences as they lead to a reduced gross dome-
stic product (GDP) and a decrease in revenues. For the 
worker, 
“work-related risks are greater, such as less secure contracts, 
fewer benefits and poorer working conditions for wagewor-
kers. (…) [The workers] suffer from inadequate labor le-
gislation, labor protection and social security schemes and 
have limited access to wage workers organizations. In ad-
dition, their incomes are low and irregular and they have 
a very limited bargaining power to increase salaries” (Flod-
man Becker 2004: 21).
This section of the paper analyzes informal labor in BiH 
with the aim of identifying policy options. First, a short 
methodological approach will be outlined to show how a 
phenomenon like informal economy, that is by definition 
not subject to official statistics, can be assessed. This will 
be followed by an analysis of the Bosnian labor market 
with special regard to the status of formal and informal 
employment, the characteristics of the workforce and the 
developments in the labor market in general. It will be-
come clear that informal relations still play an important 
role when it comes to labor. The final part addresses and 
substantiates appropriate macroeconomic and labor mar-
ket policies. The weak formal economy, the annual loss 
of a considerable share of revenue and the local political 
weight of informal employers are three reasons why poli-
cy makers should make a comprehensive effort to reduce 
informal labor. The contribution’s main argument is that 
this can only be achieved through a set of measures which 
go beyond mere macroeconomic policy and take into ac-
count the regional (power) political settings.
 
2. Informal Labor in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
2.1. Data acquisition
It is difficult, though not impossible, to assess informal 
procedures and processes that are by definition beyond 
state control. Most countries rely on indirect measure-
ment methods such as segmenting wage employees enu-
merated in labor force surveys in order to determine 
which ones belong to the informal sector. Comparisons 
then can be made with data on establishments or enter-
prises, e.g. with administrative records.
Another possibility is the direct measurement of informal 
activities through household surveys. In order to capture 
the whole range of informal labor, questions must cover 
many variables; to capture the work of children, the mi-
nimum age limit must be lowered when measuring the 
economically active population. Special probes have to be 
taken for unpaid work in small family enterprises, acti-
vities undertaken by women on their own account at or 
from home, undeclared activities, casual jobs, and infor-
mal activities performed as secondary jobs by farmers, 
government officials or employees of the private formal 
sector (Hussmans 2004: 9).
Usually, the Yearbook of Labor Statistics of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) is the main source for 
empirical measures of informal employment, as its data 
is highly comparable and uses well-defined categories 
(Ihrig/Moe 2000: 334). Today, household and enterprise 
surveys are usually combined to serve as an efficient and 
comprehensive way of measuring informal labor. While 
direct measurements are unable to provide a basis for 
estimates on its growth or development, they do allow for 
an analysis of the enterprises and the workforce of the in-
formal sector (Ihrig/Moe 2000: 17).
Regarding the case of BiH, statistical coverage of the eco-
nomic situation is very poor. While the statistics system 
did not operate and data was lost during the war, sepa-
rate statistics agencies were set up in the FBH and the 
RS in 1995 (World Bank 2005a: 3). Their collection and 
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processing methodologies were later unified by the Sta-
te-level Agency for Statistics (BHAS) established in 1998. 
Today, there are still many technical and some institutio-
nal challenges to be overcome but the situation is slowly 
improving. The demand for statistical analysis is huge; 
for example, the last census was taken before the war. In 
2006, BHAS conducted its first annual Labor Force Survey 
(BHAS 2007). 
As of now, there are a few mixed household and enterpri-
se surveys that institutions and organizations rely upon. 
They cover the short period from 2001 to 2004 and thus 
do not allow for the analysis of long-term developments. 
However, they do provide information on the extent and 
composition of economic activities at a certain time.
2.2. Formal and Informal Employment 2001-
2004
The following section gives an overview of the labor mar-
ket in BiH, including labor participation in relation to the 
total population, the proportion of formal and informal 
employment as well as characteristics of the labor force.10
Generally, BiH has a very low labor participation rate, 
i.e. a small proportion of the working-age population has 
or is seeking employment. At 53.7 percent in 2002, it was 
among the lowest in Europe.11 For Bosnian women, the rate 
is considerably below the average at 38.4 percent, while the 
rate for men is at 69.4 percent. Interestingly, the World 
Bank (2005a: 109-110) observed that labor participation is 
very responsive to changes in employment offers: “An in-
crease of close to 12% (…) [in] just one year shows that in-
dividuals are willing to participate [(…)] (i.e. more people 
register as unemployed and seeking a job) if and when job 
opportunities become available.” This could also be a sign 
for the sense of self-reliability among the Bosnian people 
who do not trust state agencies to find employment un-
10 Unless quoted otherwise, all numbers are taken from the          
Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) that is globally 
conducted by the World Bank every year (see World Bank 2005b, 
especially 75-95). The preliminary issue of the BHAS Labor Force 
Survey 2006 provides data for that year. However, the highly 
significant differences between the figures of the World Bank 
and the BHAS raise the question whether the data really is 
comparable; e.g. according to the BHAS, the employment rate in 
2006 was 29,7 percent, while the World Bank employment rate 
for 2004 was 43,7 percent. Also the labor force participation 
differs by more than 10 percent (53,7 percent in 2004, World 
Bank – 43,1 percent in 2006, BHAS). The BHAS was contacted 
via email by the author for an explanation, but has not yet 
responded to the inquiry. For matters of inner consistency and 
comparability, this paper will therefore rely exclusively on the 
World Bank data from 2001 to 2004. 
11 The Euro zone average in 2002 was 70.38 percent (OECD 
Economic Outlook 79, August 2006).
less there are very concrete signs of employment growth. 
Despite this growth in active persons, there is no change 
in the labor participation rate, as the total working-age 
population also has been increasing.
In 2002, less than 43 percent (46 percent in 2004) of the 
working age (15-64 years) population in BiH were em-
ployed. While employment was a little below average in 
the RS (39 percent), it was accordingly higher in the FBH 
(49 percent). Men in the RS were the only ones whose em-
ployment rate decreased (61 percent to 58 percent), while 
everyone else’s increased.
In the same period, more than one third of all employees 
were working in the informal sector (World Bank 2005b: 
vi). Between 2001 and 2004, this share increased in the RS 
on a generally higher level from 41 to 49 percent, while 
in the FBH it averaged 33 percent and 36 percent. As the 
BHAS Labor Force Survey 2006 did not include informal 
labor, it is hard to judge whether Sullivan (2006) is right 
when stating that the informal economy has diminished 
since the beginning of that year. But given its small incre-
ase in the years before, one should at least be cautious to 
predict its decline.12
At the same time, unemployment13 rose from about 16 
(2001) to 21.4 percent (2002) in both the RS and the FBH. 
It is higher for women and alarmingly high for the youth 
– close to half of the 19-24 year olds are unemployed. It is 
also higher in the FBH in comparison to the RS and for 
older workers above the age of 55. Based on self-reported 
unemployment, however, the rate declined slightly from 
one third in 2001 to 30 percent (2004).14 Even the esti-
mated net job creation15 of 50,000 jobs between 2002 and 
2004 (World Bank 2005b: 110) did not suffice given the 
increase in working age population. Remarkably, the cre-
ation of employment did not occur at the expense of wor-
king hours. The percentage of employees working more 
than 40 hours per week has steadily increased from 88 
(2001) to 92 percent (2003). 
The vast majority (87 percent) of jobs was created in the 
12 The predicted decline might occur regarding informal 
markets where the introduction of value-added tax is starting to 
show effects (Sullivan 2006). But it is hard to see where that 
would make a difference in informal labor.
13 A person is classified as unemployed if he/she is (a) in the                 
working age population (15-64) but not employed and (b) seeking 
work in the last 4 weeks and (c) available for work (World Bank 
2005b: 76).
14 The  difference between official and self-reported unem-
ployment is due to several reasons, e.g. the number of workers 
that have been laid-off and are thus de facto unemployed (Ja-
hovic 1999: 94).
15 The term “net job creation” describes the number of jobs 
which were newly created, already deducted by the number of 
jobs which were cut during the reference period of time.
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ter increased until 2004, while the share of private firms 
decreased. According to the World Bank (2005b: 6), 
“this reinforces the previous observation about the limi-
ted role for employment creation that small firms appear 
to have recently played, as does the fact that the share of 
construction and manufacturing in informal employment 
decreased by 15% and 8%, respectively, in the last three years 
(2001-2004).”
Instead, an increasing number of people support them-
selves through farm work. Even if these forms of subsis-
tence farming might not harm the state in the same way 
major tax evasion by companies does, and even if most 
unemployed people can find jobs in the informal sector, 
Jasmin Redzepovic (2006: 152) warns against the conclu-
sion that unemployment is less severe than the official 
statistics indicate: “Most of the grey economy is simply 
the survival strategies of those who have been forced out 
of regular employment.” Given the chance, nearly all of 
them would prefer to have a working contract and to be 
protected by labor legislation than to work informally 
and in dependence on their employers.
In sum, an increasing number of workers, including a 
very high percentage of young, poorly educated indivi-
duals and women, are employed in the informal sector. 
Half of them are farm workers, either self-employed or 
working in a family business. Employment in the formal 
sector is only increasing very slowly. At the same time pu-
blic administration and the large state-owned companies 
continue to be over-staffed. There is an enormous need 
for (new) formal employment opportunities.
3. Policy Options and a Closer Look at the 
Origin of Informality
When formulating policy, governments should recognize 
the importance and the potential of informal labor. The 
common objective is to formalize all informal activities 
so that the state benefits from them. The growth of the 
private sector should be encouraged and the needs and 
vulnerabilities of informal workers as well as employers’ 
interests should be taken into account. This means that 
legislation has to be adjusted. Just as importantly, law im-
plementation and enforcement have to be ensured in or-
der for the state to gain and then preserve its credibility.
Policy should tackle different aspects of the informal labor 
phenomenon. Besides macroeconomic measures, there 
are specific options in labor market policy. Last but not 
least, the environment or culture of informality should be 
taken into consideration and relevant actions introduced.
informal sector. Looking at the sizes of the respective com-
panies, it shows that small and medium firms were the 
only ones with a net job creation. In fact, even though the 
number of jobs cut in large companies was only a fraction 
of the number of cut jobs in small and medium firms, it 
was not balanced by a sufficient number of newly created 
employment opportunities. The World Bank ascribes this 
difference in labor turnover (the rate of change of person-
nel) inter alia to a difference in ownership structure. Whi-
le the state is still holding the majority ownership stakes in 
bigger companies, small and medium firms have generally 
been privatized and are thus forced to yield to the market 
(World Bank 2005a: 111).
Regarding the age criterion, one fifth of the informal wor-
kers are 25 years old or younger. On the one hand, the 
same share of the total population is less than 24 years old, 
so one could say that this is just adequate. On the other 
hand, the fact that only 6 percent of formal employees are 
that young illustrates the inaccessibility of the formal la-
bor market for the youth.
As is the case with youth, poorly educated people are si-
milarly affected by unemployment and informal employ-
ment. For those with no elementary education, the em-
ployment rate rose from 20 percent (2001) to 25 percent 
(2002). It increases constantly with educational attainment 
– little more than half of the people with a two-year col-
lege education and three fourths of those with a four-year 
university education are employed. Given the current low 
enrolment rates at successively higher levels of education, 
unemployment and informality are further aggravated 
(World Bank 2005b: 4).
Looking at the different sectors, the surveys show that in-
formal employment is “heavily concentrated on the agri-
cultural sector” (World Bank 2005b: vii). The percentage 
of those informal workers in agriculture actually increased 
from 42 percent in 2002 to 49 percent in 2004, followed 
by construction (19 percent), manufacturing, and trade (9 
percent each). The ESI (2006: 90) argues that many of tho-
se who “first moved from farm work into industrial em-
ployment in the 1960s and 1970s are now forced to return 
to the villages and lifestyles they abandoned a generation 
ago.” Many people would rather emigrate and many also 
do (ESI 2006: 90).16
Regarding the employment status in BiH, in 2001 the ma-
jority of informal workers were privately employed, while 
25 percent conducted freelance work and about 20 percent 
were contributing family members, i.e. individuals em-
ployed in a family business (OECD 2001). Both of the lat-
16 See Simon Runkel’s part of this Working Paper on the brain 
drain phenomenon.
   17
B a k e,  R u N k e l ,  S c h e I d :  S o c I o - e co N o m I c  a S p e c t S  o f  p e ac e B u I l d I N g . cc S  w o r k i n g  pa p e r s  N o.  8
3.1. Macroeconomic Policy – Invigorating 
the Economy
In general, the formal labor market in BiH would profit 
from economic growth. In 2002, the country’s GDP was 
only at 76 percent of the 1989 level. Given the government’s 
50 percent share of GDP, BiH’s biggest challenge is an in-
crease of private investment in the country’s economy as 
well as the attraction of foreign direct investment. Accor-
ding to Daalder and Froman (1999: 109), “Bosnia faces 
economic challenges that (…) go to the heart of creating 
strong economic institutions: the creation of a transparent 
regulatory regime, a reliable tax system, a judiciary with 
integrity.”
The biggest recent attempt at strengthening the Bosnian 
economy was the introduction of a value added tax (VAT) 
in January 2006. Expectations regarding its effects were 
high, including “strengthening of domestic competition 
and the promotion of better governance” (World Bank 
2005b: viii), among others.
While the VAT theoretically does not yield more revenue 
than a conventional sales tax, it is a single tax collected by 
a central agency, making corruption difficult. As a result, 
it has generated a considerably higher output already. Ac-
cording to Sullivan (2006), the VAT introduction elimi-
nated a “huge area of tax evasion” and brought numerous 
companies into the regular economy.
Another aspect is the promotion of a business-friendly 
environment. According to Donais (2003: 371), corrupti-
on can be seen as a coping mechanism given long public 
administration processes like business registration, which 
used to take up to 90 days. Reducing the administrative 
burden has been the aim of the often-quoted “Bulldozer 
Initiative”17 that the OHR started in 2002. Entrepreneurs 
were invited to make specific suggestions for single arti-
cles, which were then reviewed by legal experts. A set of 
50 proposals was presented and legislation was passed on 
all of them (Sullivan 2006). The economic effects have not 
been measured, but all parties involved – politicians, en-
trepreneurs, media, and analysts – welcomed the initiative 
and the anticipated outcomes.18
Still, economic growth and the facilitation of administra-
tive actions do not automatically lead to a reduction of 
informal labor. There is also a need for improvements in 
labor legislation (Flodman Becker 2004: 17).
17 For further information of the Bulldozer Initiative, see: 
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/econ/bulldozer-initiative/ , last 
accessed: August 30, 2008.
18 A valuable effect of the Bulldozer Initiative was in the sense 
of ownership it conveyed to the people in Bosnia, as they were 
asked to take the lead.
3.2. Stimulating the Formal Labor Market19
In order to improve the working conditions of the infor-
mally employed and in order to motivate employers to 
(slowly) switch to hiring people formally, legislation has 
to be adjusted to the realities of labor in BiH. As illustrated 
above, the Bosnian labor market and especially its formal 
component is characterized by a lack of labor turnover, 
a compressed wage structure, comparatively high wages, 
very low labor participation, and processes such as the 
wage determination mechanisms that function primarily 
according to pre-transition behavior (World Bank 2005a: 
101). Just like any other sphere of society, the labor market 
suffers from the effects of a post-war as well as post-soci-
alism reality.
The Bosnian labor market has a “noticeable duality 
between the functioning and performing of its formal and 
informal elements” (World Bank 2005a: 101). On the one 
hand, there is a relatively rigid and poorly functioning for-
mal labor market that is dominated by large-scale (state-
owned) companies. On the other hand, there is a highly 
flexible informal market based on small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME). Also, dimensions such as gender, 
age and education are dually divided between the two ty-
pes of markets. Women, youth and people with vocational 
training or lower education are more likely to be employ-
ed in the informal market, while men, middle-aged people 
and those who have at least a secondary school diploma 
have jobs in the formal market.
Following its analysis of the Bosnian labor market, the 
World Bank outlined several policy recommendations to 
invigorate formal labor. Besides calling for the improve-
ment of the statistical analysis of labor in BiH, it propo-
sed the establishment of a state-level economic and social 
council. The council could serve as a forum to discuss the 
medium-term labor market and collective bargaining re-
forms (2005b: xvi).
The World Bank also observed that the non-enforcement 
of rigid regulations leads to informality. Not knowing 
whether they actually will have to face prosecution and 
knowing the crucial disadvantages of complying with 
official procedures, employers are in a difficult position. 
Besides creating uncertainty among employers and new 
investors, the non-enforcement of regulations leaves 
workers without the protection they are entitled to. To 
19 This section relies exclusively on World Bank data, as no 
other data could be obtained. In view of the ideological 
orientation of the World Bank, the lack of alternative sources is 
especially critical when it comes to economic analyses. This lack 
of other sources as well as the ideological factor should be kept in 
mind when reading this section.
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improve this situation the World Bank suggested the re-
laxation of labor regulations in several aspects, while the 
remaining regulations should be enforced more strongly. 
First, they pointed to the relatively high wage increases 
for formal jobs in BiH that are not backed up by an ac-
cordingly higher productivity. While payroll taxes have 
recently been declining, net wages increased annually by 
9 percent in the FBH and 11 percent in the RS in 2003 and 
2004. Reasons might be the strong bargaining position 
of workers with “protected jobs”20 and the functioning of 
the collective bargaining process (World Bank 2005a: 105-
106). High labor costs, however, have a negative impact on 
the competitiveness of Bosnian companies. Therefore the 
position of employers in the collective bargaining process 
should be strengthened.
Second, the World Bank proposed a gradual reduction of 
the minimum wage. Compared to other transition econo-
mies, the level of the minimum wage (49 percent of the 
average wage in the FBH, 26 percent in the RS) is relatively 
high, which might keep employers from hiring. Instead, 
people are asked to work informally for a lower wage and 
without any labor protection. Especially the youth is af-
fected by this – as young people are often hired for low-
paid jobs, minimum wage policies are highly relevant 
for their employment situation (World Bank 2005b: 128). 
Given the extremely high youth unemployment rate of 
56 percent in 2004, World Bank analysts suggested that 
youth should not be covered by collective bargaining ag-
reements, or instead that a separate youth minimum wage 
should be introduced.
Third, the mechanisms of collective bargaining and wage 
determination should be reviewed. At the moment, the 
wages for all sectors (public and private) are negotiated 
together, which does not serve the interests of all parties as 
public and private employers are subject to different con-
ditions (different restraints and necessities). Separate con-
sultations for the public administration should be held. In 
the bargaining process, the private sector should be em-
powered and the agreement coverage should be limited 
to those present at the negotiations in order to give the 
affected firms a chance to influence the outcome.
In view of the generally low female labor participation, 
maternity leave duration (one year) should perhaps be 
reduced as it may act as a barrier to female employment. 
In addition, maternity benefits in the FBH are officially 
20 The World Bank report also highlighted this term, but did 
not specify what was meant by “protected”. It did not indicate 
either what could be the reason for the workers’ strong bargaining 
position. One reason may lie in the legacy of “social ownership”, 
giving workers a strong feeling of identification and pride over 
their workplace.
paid through the social insurance, yet are de facto left to 
individual employers (World Bank 2005b: xiv). This could 
definitely be a disincentive for companies to hire women, 
which is essential to increase the overall labor participati-
on. Therefore, the entities should ensure the payment of 
maternity benefits through the social security system.
As the formal labor market is marked by a lack of mobility, 
certain measures would help to raise workers’ flexibility. 
For one, legislation should be reviewed on the matter of 
temporary lay-offs. As there is no possibility to officially 
suspend someone from work for a period of time, the in-
dividuals in question officially remain employed and are 
not able to seek another job with social security benefits, 
because their “workbook”21 has to remain with their offi-
cial employer. An additional option would be to develop 
an alternative to workbooks in order to allow workers to 
obtain a second job with social security benefits.
The lack of flexibility and oversized workforces of the lar-
ge-scale state-owned companies are not easy to tackle. One 
can propose the reduction of staff and the sale of company 
shares, but the actual implementation requires a change in 
thinking. As mentioned above, the World Bank observed 
that both managers and employees still behave and act ac-
cording to a pre-transition logic – while managers do not 
take market-oriented decisions (but hire and fire to secure 
their own position in the company), employees are not 
ready to enforce their claims on firms: “Firms rarely take 
difficult decisions related to rightsizing the labor force 
and resisting automatic wage increases, even when their 
survival is at stake” (World Bank 2005a: vii). The necessa-
ry change in thinking, actually a change in management 
culture, could perhaps be triggered by different incentives, 
but it will definitely need years to take place.
Given the remote employment opportunities of the poor-
ly educated as well as their comparatively low wages, the 
government should further introduce policies to promote 
secondary and higher education. Only 73 percent of 15 to 
18 year olds are enrolled in secondary schools, compared 
to an average in most European countries of 85-95 percent 
(World Bank 2005b: 7). Compulsory school attendance 
should be extended while the quality of education should 
be improved.
To conclude, there is a need for additional legislation con-
cerning issues such as maternity duration and benefits and 
minimum wage. Furthermore, particular regulations such 
as the collective bargaining process are too rigid and need 
to be reviewed.
21 A workbook serves the same purpose as a (wage) tax card. 
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3.3. The Power of Informal Employers
In addition to macroeconomic policy in general and la-
bor policy in particular, one should take into account that 
informal labor as a phenomenon might – in one way or 
another – be embedded in the (current) Bosnian culture. 
Therefore, it is important to identify the links between in-
formal labor on the one hand and history as well as the 
daily reality of people on the other.
Some authors argue that BiH has a long tradition of a clan-
destine political economy (Festic/ Rausche 2004: 28; Yan-
nis 2003: 183). For one, it is still coping with the socialist 
legacy of closely interwoven relations between the politi-
cal, the social and the economic sphere. Secondly, the war 
from 1992 to 1995 allowed war entrepreneurs to combine 
political power and (local) social influence with economic 
gain even more effectively than before. Entrepreneurs with 
political influence, with contacts to the pre-war adminis-
trative elite and the paramilitary groups did not only seize 
the moment of war to gain control over former state pro-
duction sites to secure their future (political) power; they 
also cooperated for profit and gained millions of Euros on 
the black market regardless of their different ethnicities 
(Ehrke 2002: 14). Today, there continues to be a “lack of 
institutional separation between politics and economics 
within BiH, and this situation in turn reflects the success 
of the country’s ruling elites in resisting international ef-
forts to reduce their direct influence over the economy” 
(Donais 2003: 365). The manifold economic and political 
links therefore have to be taken into account when desig-
ning arrangements to secure the rule of law, but also when 
formulating economic policy.
According to Ehrke (2002: 22), the informal economy as a 
whole has been ethnically separated and controlled by the 
pre-war and wartime local elites. The ethnic separation 
primarily serves as a mechanism to preserve some leeway 
for illegal economic activities against the legal-bureauc-
ratic state. These elites do not have an interest in the im-
provement of the formal market because they fear losing 
profits as well as political power. Even though half of the 
informal workers are self-supporting farm workers, more 
than 18 percent of the working population still depend on 
these elites to make a living. In a situation like this, “vo-
ting becomes an act of loyalty towards those individuals 
and groups who your own economic survival depends 
on” (Ehrke 2002: 26). Ehrke further points to the resul-
ting contradiction between the efforts of the international 
community to promote democracy and its powerlessness 
given the “quasi feudal economic interdependence” (2002: 
26) which prevents the development of democratic citi-
zenship. From his point of view, the further development 
of a formal economy becomes a prerequisite not only for 
economic stability, but also for BiH’s political future.
Therefore, one of the ways to reduce informal labor would 
be to weaken the ties between the (local) political and the 
economic sphere, as well as to deprive ‘informal employ-
ers’ of other illegally obtained profits. These efforts can be 
manifold. Donais (2003: 375-376) suggests 
“measures aimed at severing the direct links between ruling 
parties and lucrative state-owned enterprises, […] measures 
aimed at shutting down conflict-induced trans-border trade 
and smuggling networks, and at strategies that are more ef-
fective in combating organized crime and corruption.” 
In single big cases such as the HDZ’s22 attempt in 2001 to 
establish a third entity by controlling the political econo-
my (Festic/Rausche 2004: 30-32) or Radovan Karadzic’s 
support network in the clandestine political economy 
(Festic/Rausche 2004: 28-30), the BiH authorities made 
an effort to weaken the actors’ underground political and 
economic resources. Law-enforcement and anti-corrupti-
on capacities were built up. Furthermore, since 2002, the 
High Representative has made extensive use of his powers 
to remove uncooperative local officials and to impose an 
impressive range of legislative reforms in order to redu-
ce corruption. Section II of the Criminal Division of the 
Court of Bosnia Herzegovina deals exclusively with orga-
nized crime, economic crime and corruption (Court of 
Bosnia Herzegovina 2006).
Creating formal employment opportunities will remain 
the essential challenge in the next decade. Moreover, it 
would be wise to weaken the local elites’ weight in the 
economy in general and particularly in the informal labor 
market, as described above, in order to successfully reduce 
informal labor.
4. Outlook
The aim of this section was to identify policy options for 
dealing with informal labor in BiH. Informal labor redu-
ces state revenue, leaves workers in insecure, low-paid po-
sitions, and threatens BiH’s economic development. It thus 
jeopardizes the country’s political stability and the success 
of the peacebuilding process more generally. It has been 
shown that the Bosnian labor market is marked by very 
low, but increasing labor participation. Due to a growing 
working age population, official unemployment increased 
despite the creation of (a few) formal job opportunities. 
The non-enforcement of rigid regulations regarding e.g. a 
22 HDZ: Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, a Croat nationalist 
party that is active in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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high minimum wage and amendable collective bargaining 
process leads to an increase in informality. Legislation ad-
justments in specific labor policies are therefore necessa-
ry. Due to the lack of formal employment opportunities, 
however, half of the informally employed work in the ag-
ricultural sector which is not affected by such policies. The 
introduction of a legislative framework promoting private 
investments and the growth of the private sector should 
thus be an additional objective of policy makers, as the 
resulting economic growth would entail additional formal 
employment opportunities.
The issue of the pre-war and wartime elites in the role of 
informal employers illustrates the continuously close links 
between the economic and the political sphere in BiH and 
the continuing significance of ethnicity in Bosnian society. 
It is crucial that policy makers in Bosnia take note of the-
se links and decide to take a firm stand against informal 
labor in order to make economic prosperity and political 
stability possible.
The very first step, however, should be to aim at a better 
overview over the current status and structure of informal 
labor. Especially current measurement techniques need 
refinement. As United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) economist Clement Jackson puts it: “Non-formal 
markets are defined by flux and shifting patterns of ex-
change, making observations, generalizations, and quan-
tification difficult. Economic theory has little in the way 
of methodologies to meet the demands of this flux” (quo-
ted in Nordstrom 2004: 231). One does not have to agree 
entirely with Carolyn Nordstrom’s criticism of the “couch 
potato economists” who are allegedly just too lazy to do 
the necessary field work to find the idea of an anthropo-
logical approach to informal labor appealing. Speaking of 
what she calls “shadow economies,” Nordstrom (2004: 15) 
remarks: 
“Ethnography is an excellent way to study the invisibilities of 
power – invisibility that is in part constructed by convincing 
people not to study the shadows, convincing them that the 
place-less is impossible to situate in study, that it is ‘out of 
site.’” 
One does not have to rely exclusively on ethnographic 
methods to value their contribution to a comprehensive 
analysis of informal economic relations. They would al-
low one to study the “culture of informality,” observing the 
groups and individuals involved (entrepreneurs, profiteers, 
supporters, helpers, and employees) and their interaction 
as well as the specific codes of conduct and taboos. Who 
has reasons to engage in informal economic activity and 
what are the reasons? To what extent do actors differen-
tiate between legal and illegal action, which explicit and 
implicit rules apply to their interaction? Most importantly, 
one should keep in mind that the line between formal and 
informal, legal and illegal, licit and illicit is not naturally 
given but socially constructed. Informal activities should 
not be criminalized per se. Instead, one should also look 
at it in the way that those who engage in it do – regarding 
it as a way to make a living.
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c) Brain drain in Bosnia-herzegovina 
- Boon or Bane?  by Simon Runkel
Bosnia and Herzegovina faces many different challenges 
in the continued peacebuilding process. One of them is 
the ongoing exodus of educated young people. Having 
finished their studies, many young people typically try 
to leave the country as soon as possible. This process is 
known as brain drain. While the potential societal contri-
bution of this well-educated part of the population cannot 
be measured, it is safe to say that this presents a signifi-
cant loss for the country. Yet, given the continuously weak 
economy and the lack of job perspectives, their wish to 
emigrate is understandable.
Former High Representative Paddy Ashdown said: “This 
hemorrhage of the young and talented poses perhaps the 
greatest long-term threat to this country” (quoted in Fi-
scher 2004: 3). Using the term “hemorrhage,” Ashdown 
frames the migration of the young people as an entirely 
negative development. This section of the Working Paper 
aims to supplement this point of view by also identifying 
positive effects of the brain drain phenomenon. Especially 
in regard to the geographical location of BiH at the gates of 
the European Union, it will be interesting to take a look at 
these migration movements. In reality this could indicate 
“brain globalization” and the strengthening of transnati-
onal ties to diasporas, and thus lead to positive synergy 
effects in BiH itself. These contacts abroad could improve 
the access to knowledge and potentially contribute to the 
country’s economic development. Also, these networks, 
which are also rooted in mostly well-developed countries 
and the developing country, could be seen as a chance for 
sustainable peace, especially regarding the prospects of 
EU accession. This section seeks to evaluate these theses 
in a way that breaks ranks with traditional explanations.
The first part illuminates the history and the meaning of 
the term brain drain. This is followed by an analysis of the 
possible effects as well as the negative characteristics of the 
phenomenon. Here, the focus lies on developing coun-
tries, a category under which many post-war countries23 
can be subsumed. The third part outlines the challenges 
and perspectives for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the ed-
ucational and economic area. The section concludes on a 
counter-intuitive note, emphasizing the potential benefits 
of the phenomenon.
At the outset, it has to be stressed that research on the 
topic is hardly comprehensive. Brain drain as well as the 
23 Developing countries and post-war countries often have 
similar features, albeit with a different causation, including a low 
degree of industrialization (in post-war countries, as a result of 
armed hostilities), a low standard of living, and a low income.
characteristic effects of returnees in the European context 
are understudied. One of the few studies in this field was 
conducted by Hunger (2003), who researched the cha-
racteristics of returnees based on the case of Indian soft-
ware companies. Unfortunately, the literature on migrati-
on in Bosnia and Herzegovina is meager. Statistical data 
is either unavailable or not very reliable, as most of the 
sources stem from NGOs whose strategic interests have 
to be taken into account. Thus, in the absence of a more 
comprehensive research base, this section of the paper re-
presents a preliminary examination of the field.
1. Definition: “Brain Drain”24
The term “brain drain” was introduced for the first time 
in a British study describing the migration of highly qua-
lified employees from Great Britain to the United States 
at the end of the Second World War. The intention of the 
study was to call attention to the flaccidities of the British 
science system. During the 1960s this topic was extended 
to the migration of highly-skilled people from developing 
countries to industrialized countries. Hunger used depen-
dence theory and modernization theory to explain this 
phenomenon.
Dependence theory sees brain drain as a symbol of the 
exploitation of developing countries by the rich and in-
dustrialized countries as the latter states actively recruit 
employees abroad without paying for their training costs. 
The theory focuses on the underdevelopment of the poor 
countries, and recommends a self-reliance strategy. In ad-
dition, reparations from the industrialized countries and, 
in the 1970s, a brain drain tax were discussed.
Modernization theory describes brain drain in more am-
bivalent terms. The focus is on the migration of elites from 
developing countries in consideration of a free and global 
labor market. Accordingly, brain drain has to be assessed 
against the backdrop of an international factor balance 
and a global welfare gain. The cause for brain drain is seen 
in the generally worse condition of the economy and labor 
market in developing countries (Holzmann/Münz 2003: 
19). As a strategy against the negative effects, a general en-
hancement of the circumstances in the developing coun-
tries was recommended to optimize the attractiveness for 
those who intend to emigrate.
To explain migration, mostly push-pull models are used. 
In the process, push-factors are the repelling strengths, 
while pull-factors represent the attractiveness of the mig-
ration destination (Bähr 2004: 261-272).
24 The following section draws upon Hunger (2003: 10-12) 
unless otherwise indicated.
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It is important to note that that brain drain has different 
characteristics and intensities: it therefore has to be exa-
mined in context-sensitive ways. In general, it is clear that 
brain drain has economic effects. Lowell (2003) formula-
ted different types of so-called “brain mobility”:
“High skilled mobility: movement of highly trained persons, 
typically the college educated, but also secondary educated;
Brain drain: occurs with significant losses of the highly skil-
led and few offsetting economic feedbacks;
Optimal brain drain: possible emigration can stimulate stu-
dents in sending countries to pursue higher education;
[...]
Brain circulation: a significant rate of return migration 
brings valuable skills and connections;
[...]
Brain globalization: some level of skilled mobility is needed 
to participate in the global economy”.
The following section will differentiate between the poten-
tial positive and negative effects in more detail.
2. Potential Effects of Brain Drain
In the 1970s, the French researcher Ladame was the first to 
argue that brain drain could turn into “brain gain” if the 
migrated elites later return to their home country (Hunger 
2003: 14) and proposed the term “circulation des élites,” 
which later entered the literature as “brain circulation,” to 
capture the potentially cyclical nature of the phenomenon 
(Hunger 2003: 14; Holzmann/Münch 2004: 20). Sriskan-
darajah (2005) suggests, “the very notion of ‘brain drain’ 
may be outdated and simplistic, wrongly implying that 
the impacts of the movement of highly skilled people are 
always and everywhere a bad thing.” In line with this ar-
gument, this paper argues that the negative consequences 
of brain drain may be balanced by a potentially positive 
aftermath. First of all, it is essential to explore the different 
possible effects of brain drain until it is connoted a priori 
in a purely negative way.
In the first instance the country of origin certainly suf-
fers under the loss of human resources, especially when 
it comes to the migration of its motivated and innovative 
youth (Holzmann/Münz 2004: 20). Those emigrants from 
countries where only a few people receive a tertiary edu-
cation are not only better educated but also more highly 
skilled (Newland 2003). The loss for the developing coun-
tries expresses itself most notably through the loss of trai-
ning costs, which mostly are highly subsidized by the state 
(Newland 2003; La Cava/Lytle/Kolev/Clert 2004: 58; Holz-
mann/Münz 2004: 20). In addition, the fiscal costs have 
to be taken into account as the migration of the potential 
well-to-do stratum means a significant loss of potential tax 
revenue (Newland 2003; Holzmann/Münz 2004: 20). In 
countries with a weak human resource base, it is possible 
that the educational system is not able to compensate the 
emigrated manpower. For example the migration of physi-
cians is a considerable risk for the health care system of de-
veloping countries (Holzmann/Münz 2004: 8). Otherwise 
the alternative to emigrate can be regarded as an incentive 
for young people to attain better education, and many of 
them eventually do (Lowell 2003; Holzmann/Münz 2003: 
8; Sriskandarajah 2005). It is important to note, however, 
that many of the emigrants had been unemployed in their 
home country anyway25 (Sriskandarajah 2005).
Many emigrants come back like Ladame assumed, often 
with greater skills (Sriskandarajah 2005; Ostwald 2006). 
The highly skilled typically return to their home country 
to start a business and to use local comparative advantages 
(Hunger 2003: 15). An advanced training abroad and incre-
ased language skills significantly enhance the possibilities 
to get a job in the home country (Ahmetasevic/Poucher 
Harbin 2002). This can be seen as a transfer of skills, alt-
hough Holzmann and Münz (2004: 20) rightly point out 
that this issue has yet to be researched more thoroughly.
Another aspect – and presumably the most quoted – are 
remittances from emigrants (Newland 2003; Holzmann/
Münz 2004: 20). All remittances combined are estimated 
as exceeding $ 100 billion per year, 60 percent of which 
flow into developing countries (Newland 2003; Holz-
mann/Münz 2004: 20).26 But remittances can also be out-
right problematic because they tend to “increase inequali-
ty, encourage consumption of imports, and create depen-
dency” (Newland 2003).
Nevertheless, remittances certainly have a positive effect 
on the household of the beneficiary because they incre-
ase the standards of living (Newland 2003). As a matter of 
consequence we can understand remittances as the em-
beddedness in a social welfare system based on personal 
networks, which can help to avert more emigration, vita-
lize local economies and build “the kinds of institutional 
mechanisms and services needed for sustainable post-
conflict rebuilding” (Weiss Fagen/Bump 2006: 8).
25 The literature speaks of “brain waste” in this context 
(Holzmann/Münz 2004).
26 “Feedback from expatriates includes today more than $ 32 
billion in remittances sent to Latin America (...), a figure often 
larger than US aid or foreign direct investment” (Lowell 2003). 
In Kosovo, for example, private remittances from Kosovo-
Albanians living abroad constitute the primary source of income, 
amounting to 43  percent of the GDP (La Cava/Lytle/Kolev/Clert 
2004). Referring to UN statistical data, Ostwald (2006) estimates 
that remittances added up to 30 billion Euros in 2005 in total.
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The organization of so-called diaspora networks has to be 
seen as a chance for the developing country (Hunger 2003: 
14-15; Sriskandarajah 2005). Hunger (2003: 14-15) cites sci-
ence networks in this connection, which can ignite posi-
tive effects for the developing countries due to possible 
technology and knowledge transfers. Furthermore, busi-
ness networks are instrumental in advancing investments 
and inviting manpower back into the home country (Lo-
well 2003; Hunger 2003: 15). Above all, Cochrane (2007) 
shows that Diaspora communities have the potential to 
interact in peacebuilding processes in their homelands in 
a positive way.
In addition, aspects like tourism in the home country 
should also be taken into account (Newland 2003); it fa-
cilitates exchange and can thus give important impulses 
for the development of the whole country (La Cava/Lyt-
le/Kolev/Clert 2004: 57). Likewise, fundraising for politi-
cal candidates and nostalgia for foods and products of the 
country of origin should not be underestimated (Newland 
2003). Given that ”[t]ransnational networks are today the 
most important developmental resource associated with 
international migration,” states’ efforts at strengthening 
the ties with the diaspora are a very promising policy 
(Newland 2003).
Yet the resulting domestic challenges must be taken into 
account as external brain drain is often accompanied by 
internal brain drain, especially in rural spaces (Holzmann/
Münz 2004: 19). It should also be mentioned that small 
states close to large labor importing regions are most like-
ly to suffer from brain drain (Holzmann/Münz 2004: 21). 
Given its geographical proximity to the EU, this includes 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the enormous obstacles to Bos-
nians’ freedom to travel into the EU notwithstanding.
3. Challenges and Perspectives for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
According to a survey in the context of the “Human De-
velopment Report BiH 2000 Youth,” 62 percent of the in-
terviewed youths vowed to leave the country if they had 
the chance (UNDP 2000: 35). A follow-up study in 2003 
established that 24 percent wanted to leave BiH forever. 
The majority of the young respondents sought to leave the 
country temporarily for either work (40 percent) or stu-
dy (13 percent), while 21 percent did not want to leave. Of 
those who wanted to leave either temporarily or perma-
nently (77 percent), 18 percent had taken concrete steps 
to do so. Other findings show that more men than women 
aspire to leave the country, with women typically seeking 
to study abroad while men are primarily looking for work 
(La Cava/Lytle/Kolev/Clert 2004: 59).
The UNDP study of 2000 revealed that nearly half of the 
Bosnian students abroad had “never thought of studying 
abroad,” but left due to the war: “The surveyed students 
represent primarily the upper middle-class; more than 
half of their mothers (55.4 percent) and two-thirds of their 
fathers (66.3 percent) have university degrees.” At the time 
of the survey, 15.1 percent of students did not want to re-
turn home at all, 10.5 percent said that they will certainly 
return, while the rest of the respondents were not ready to 
make a decision. Asked about their “biggest hope when 
you think of return” almost half of the respondents (47.8 
percent) replied that that would be “my participation in 
the reconstruction of the country by working in some fo-
reign firm.” Another 41.2 percent hoped for a job at one 
of the universities in the country with an additional 22.8 
percent wishing to start their own business (La Cava/Lyt-
le/Kolev/Clert 2004: 57). The number of those who actu-
ally left the country is estimated at 92,000 people or more 
for the period from January 1996 to March 2001 while tens 
of thousands were waiting for a visa (Ahmetasevic/Pou-
cher Harbin 2002; Fischer 2004: 3). Other sources say that 
since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 
until 2006 around 110,000 mostly young people emig-
rated from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibreljic/Kulenovic/
Kadusic/Smajic 2006). The most attracting countries for 
asylum seekers are France, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland 
and Austria, the main reasons for emigration are job op-
portunities and studying27 (Ibreljic/Kulenovic/Kadusic/
Smajic 2006).
Young people in BiH long for a better future, in particu-
lar an efficient infrastructure in their local community, 
and possibilities to get an apprenticeship and job (Fischer 
2006: 257). But many of them are unemployed, and vo-
cational training opportunities are scarce (Ahmetasevic/
Poucher Harbin 2002; Fischer 2006: 268). The prospects 
are especially dim for girls, most notably in rural areas, 
because they have little chance of attending a secondary 
school (Fischer 2006: 257). Even if they do, chances are 
that they have to attend an over-crowded high school that 
is lacking up-to-date teaching material and, even more 
importantly, teachers (Fischer 2006: 257, 260).
The unemployment rate in FBH is at more than 40 per-
cent and in the RS circa 50 percent, but the “unofficial” 
unemployment rate lies between 56 percent and 75 percent 
(Fischer 2004: 3). A third of the unemployed are young 
27 According to the Atlas of Student Mobility of the Institute 
of International Education 9,572 citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were tertiary students abroad in 2003. Host 
countries were Germany (2,801 students in 2004), Croatia (2,273 
students in 2003), Austria (1,732 students in 2004), the USA (433 
students in 2004) and Denmark (432 students in 2003) (IIE, 
http://www.atlas.iienetwork.org/?p=48069, accessed: April 1, 
2008).
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people up to the age of 27. The waiting time for a job ave-
rages 10 years, but one can assume that many live on un-
reported income in this time period (UNDP 2000: 30). 
Furthermore, young and unemployed people run the risk 
of developing destructive potential, for example by beco-
ming nationalistic or criminal (Fischer 2004: 3). Many ju-
veniles admit to supplementing their income on the black 
market.28 
The formal sector of the Bosnian economy is very weak 
and offers especially young people only few jobs (Fischer 
2004: 3). Most of the job opportunities are offered in the 
informal sector,29 44 percent of the young people work 
outside of their primary vocational field (UNDP 2000: 
31).
Commenting on the overall situation of young people in 
BiH, a spokesperson for the Youth Information Agency in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (OIA) said: “The easiest thing is 
to go in the front of some embassy and ask for a visa that 
will take you somewhere else!” (quoted in Ahmetasevic/
Poucher Harbin 2002).
And yet, BiH has also made progress in recent years. With 
an annual economic growth of 5 percent which is around 
the strongest in southeast Europe, the country is on the 
right path (Sullivan 2006). It is important to note – par-
ticularly for the youth – that the population identifies 
itself with the country, a point succinctly put by Sullivan 
(2006):
“The point at which, as in other transition or developing 
economies where one or two sectors begin to excel, is the 
point at which the population as a whole begins to regard 
the country in a different light and begins to see Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a going concern. Not only as a going con-
cern, but as our going concern.”
There are some youth work programs and NGOs in this 
field which want to improve the circumstances for young 
people. For example, the project “Young People Build 
the Future” in Tuzla offers help for self-help through 
the provision of training opportunities in the fields of 
language and IT, agriculture and woodwork (Fischer 
2006: 263). The aforementioned OIA publishes a weekly 
newsletter, informing juveniles about job vacancies (La 
Cava/Lytle/Kolev/Clert 2004: 60), devises skeleton plans 
to reduce brain drain and provides policy advice about 
how to implement these schemes. The organization backed 
28 See Julika Bake’s section of this paper on the informal 
labor.
29 People for example earn money by selling goods on the 
street, baby-sitting, language lessons (UNDP 2000: 29). See 
Julika Bake’s section of this paper on informal labor.
their advocacy work by threatening street demonstrations 
(Ahmetasevic/Poucher Harbin 2002). The “Piloting 
Solutions for Alleviating Brain Drain in Southeast Europe” 
is another notable initiative. Sponsored by UNESCO and 
Hewlett-Packard, it supports research projects as well 
as the improvement of the websites and databases at 
universities (Trader 2005). In the context of the project, 
the universities of Sarajevo and East Sarajevo introduced 
new e-learning programs in their curricula (Trader 2005). 
The NGO “Community of Bosnia” strives to establish 
connections between high-skilled young Bosnians and 
Herzegovinians living in diaspora and their homeland 
through procuring internships for them in BiH. Their 
efforts can be described as supporting skills exchange.
Given the lack of more comprehensive studies, it is im-
possible to assess the impact of this mosaic of initiatives. 
However, there is encouraging anecdotal evidence of suc-
cess in private enterprises founded by returnees. Even mo-
dest savings, accumulated while abroad, often suffice as 
start-up capital for a company in BiH. Nevertheless num-
bers of returnees are still not available or admixed with 
numbers of returnees who left during the war.
Beyond that, transnational ties to the diaspora can be seen 
as chances for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Spear quotes a 
study of the Bosnian diaspora in Great Britain from 1999:
“Despite... various obstacles to return, Bosnian refugees have 
increasingly sought links and contact with their country of 
origin. Both as individuals and as members of communi-
ty organisations, there have been few yet growing attempts 
to get involved in ongoing developments within Bosnia, i.e. 
sending financial remittances, organizing cultural and so-
cial events, and regular visits to see friends and family” (Al-
Ali/Black/Koser 1999 quoted in Spear 2006: 9).
The low-budget airlines FlyNordic and Norwegian Air 
Shuttle will fly from Stockholm and Oslo to Sarajevo in 
June 2008. In the absence of tourism, this can only be 
caused by the sizeable Bosnian diaspora in Scandinavia 
(Sullivan 2006). Other main connections to Sarajevo are 
Cologne, Munich, Frankfurt, Zurich, London, Vienna, 
Milan and Budapest. The number of persons in Germany 
with Bosnian and Herzegovinian citizenship are around 
157,120 (except children under the age of 16)30. Just as im-
portant, increasing media coverage has been generated 
“which has Bosnia and Herzegovina without war in the 
same sentence” (Sullivan 2006). All this is vital for foreign 
30 81,142 men, 75,978 women and 21,134 children under the age 
of 16. The appointed date is June 30, 2007. The information stems 
from the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Germany, 
transmitted by e-mail.
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investors and for the prospects of reinvigorating the once 
flourishing tourism industry (Sullivan 2006); but it is 
equally important for returnees who are thinking about 
starting up in BiH. Beyond that Shain and Barth (2003: 
450 quoted in Cochrane 2007: 23) emphasized that di-
asporas “are increasingly able to promote transnational 
ties, to act as bridges or mediators between their home 
and host societies, and to transmit the values of pluralism 
and democracy.” Remittances have a big impact on local 
economies of BiH, thus on the economy of BiH in gene-
ral. The country received $ 1.9 billion remittances in 2006 
(The World Bank 2007). The calculated share of the GDP 
of BiH is 22.5 percent, only Tonga, Moldova, Lesotho and 
Haiti have an even higher share (The World Bank 2005c: 
90). These remittances certainly help to accomplish pea-
cebuilding goals.
4. Outlook
Brain drain has predominantly been seen as a negative 
trend; seen through a short-term lens, this is a fair as-
sessment. A post-conflict economy like BiH suffers con-
siderably when losing the motivation and innovation of 
young people whose training costs have been high. In 
the author’s opinion, however, the long-term advantages 
are equally striking. Brain drain has to be regarded as an 
advanced training opportunity, for which people have to 
leave the country temporarily. Facing unemployment and 
intense competition on the labor market in BiH, young 
people are bound to become disillusioned and may try to 
make a living in illegal ways. Emigration offers the advan-
tage of getting a winning margin concerning their skills 
and motivation. This can be transferred back to BiH in-
directly, through networks to friends in BiH or directly in 
returning and starting up a business. Those who stay in 
BiH are faced with lower competition and a more balan-
ced labor market.
What kind of arrangements on the part of the politicians 
have to be made to give young people a perspective? The 
current policy is marred by inconsistency. It is important 
not to thwart the young, talented people on their way out 
of BiH. Also, reforms in the field of education are urgently 
needed and the quality must be raised to European stan-
dards. It is necessary to develop programs which help 
young people to study and work abroad for a period of 
about five years. After this episode they should be given 
access to subsidies that enable them to start a business, like 
financial funds or a place in a technology center. It is ne-
cessary to enable Bosnian graduates to gather experience 
abroad, but also to offer them incentives to return after a 
while and to help their home country. Various microcredit 
projects are examples of how business development poli-
cy can look like. But there is still little evidence that re-
mittances from the diaspora are channeled through official 
micro-credit projects. In this regard, universities should 
take more responsibility in supporting technology trans-
fer and offering entrepreneurship training. In view of the 
limited capacities of universities in BiH, this calls for a col-
laborative effort and a partnership between Bosnian insti-
tutions of higher learning and their counterparts in other 
parts of Europe, especially Germany and Scandinavia. In 
addition, it is essential to work towards the reduction of 
the urban-rural gap in order to increase the prospects of a 
decent education and a job in peripheral spaces.
Young people are Bosnia’s most important resource. On 
this account the international community, and especial-
ly the EU, has to exert more pressure on BiH regarding 
reforms in the field of education, including accession to 
the Bologna process, and on economic development. Es-
pecially in regard to a potential accession to the European 
Union, reforms in the field of education are imperative.
If these reforms succeed and if incentive structures are 
created for young emigrants to return, the positive long-
term effects of remittances, transnational networks and 
the likelihood of returnees starting a business in BiH may 
outweigh the short-term loss. When “brains” return back, 
they are a huge gain for the country, because they bring 
skills and are likely to promote democracy and peace.
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Conclusion
Economic development is crucial for BiH for several rea-
sons. First of all, the economy has an enormous impact on 
people’s lives – being able to make a living and to support 
themselves, people will be much more satisfied with their 
general living situation and thus less susceptible to politi-
cal populists who seek to attract voters through grand, lar-
gely unrealistic promises. These populists pose a specific 
danger to BiH, as the people remain highly vulnerable to 
ethnic tensions propagated by politicians through divisive 
rhetoric. Secondly, economic growth would reduce the 
dependence of workers on local, semi-legal entrepreneurs 
who use their control over the informal labor market to 
secure political power. In this way, economic development 
and the resulting deprivation of these economic-political 
entrepreneurs would generally contribute to political sta-
bility. Thirdly, it is also the prerequisite for the distant but 
omnipresent prospect of EU integration, which constitu-
tes the perceived “light at the end of the tunnel.” During 
virtually all interviews conducted for this Working Paper, 
officials kept alluding to the prospects of EU accession, 
despite BiH’s current non-compliance with many of the 
“Copenhagen criteria.” Last but not least, Kevin Sullivan 
of OHR’s Economic Transition Unit rightly pointed to a 
crucial psychological factor: “The point at which (…) one 
or two sectors begin to excel, is the point at which the po-
pulation as a whole begins to regard the country in a diffe-
rent light and begins to see Bosnia and Herzegovina (…) 
as our going concern” (Sullivan 2006). Economic success 
would allow people in BiH a more positive self-concepti-
on. It would help foster a sense of ownership across ethnic 
divides and make people feel as stakeholders in a joint po-
litical enterprise.31
The aim of this paper was to address the interdependence 
between the Bosnian economy on the one hand and the 
peacebuilding process on the other. All three parts argued 
that the strengthening of formal economic relations, the 
weakening of links between the economic and political 
spheres, especially on a local level, as well as the creation 
of job opportunities could contribute to a great extent to 
more economic prosperity in BiH and thus to a more suc-
31 One could also argue that the link between economic             
development and sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is particularly strong due to the economic interests that 
contributed to the war. The state of war allowed war entrepreneurs 
to more effectively combine political power and (local) social 
influence with economic gain. Profiteers seized the war as an 
opportunity to gain control over former state production sites to 
secure their future economic and/or political power; they also 
cooperated for profit and gained millions of Euros on the black 
market.
cessful peacebuilding process. Of course, it is crucial that 
all parts of society – regardless of age, place of residence 
and especially ethnicity – have the chance to participate in 
and benefit from increased economic prosperity, as gro-
wing social imbalance might abet violent conflict again. 
But overall, while the authors recognize that economic 
prosperity has its own inherent set of risks and problems, 
the potential benefits to the peacebuilding process could 
provide a lasting contribution.
Yet, where does Bosnia stand on its way to economic pro-
sperity? Its economy still has not recovered and returned 
to pre-war levels. People are still waiting for an economic 
upswing as their daily lives depend on the ability to work 
and make a living. How many job opportunities can be 
created is as difficult a question in Bosnia as elsewhere; it 
may be particularly problematic in this case though, as the 
only major analyses of the economy seem to be conducted 
by the World Bank whose policy recommendations have 
yet to show effects and whose agenda is dominated by a 
neoliberal ideology. Another challenge lies in the close-
ly interwoven links between the political and economic 
spheres. As long as local nationalists control most of the 
informal labor relations, they will maintain an influence 
over political processes and decisions. Thus, strengthe-
ning formal jobs could also mean weakening nationalists’ 
political power.
The question of EU accession fatigue remains a potential 
obstacle for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as citizens may lose 
hope in their chances to accede, thereby potentially losing 
interest in many benchmarks that currently transcend 
ethnic lines. It seems that there is a specific interest in 
the integration of BiH, as the EU has already contributed 
significantly to the peacebuilding process, including the 
EUFOR mission Althea to oversee the military implemen-
tation of the DPA as well as major financial contributions. 
Nevertheless, a potential timeframe for accession is not 
yet foreseeable. The question still remains as to whether 
this will be the true solution or if BiH will simply contri-
bute to the lowering of EU standards while stagnating in 
its economic development. Considering the uncertainty 
surrounding the issue of EU enlargement and, even if in-
tegrated, the uncertain effects for BiH, the danger remains 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina turns into a rent-seeking 
economy with mafia structures where people depend on 
informal relations to make a living.
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